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Classical Music, Copyright, and Collecting Societies: Past, Present and Future 
 
 
Introduction: Copyright and the (Classical Music) Work-Concept1 
 
Copyright and classical music have a symbiotic relationship.2 Although copyright once 
simply denoted the legal right to copy specific documents, it achieves its fullest potential 
when it defines fixed, bounded, and original abstract entities manifested in one or more 
physical modalities. The description readily applies to (implicitly classical) musical works, 
which Lydia Goehr calls ‘ontological mutants’: a piece’s identity lies neither in its score, for 
music is an aural medium, nor in any single performance or recording, for the same score 
gives rise to different interpretations; it is instead abstracted from the sum of all potential 
realisations.3 These conceptions, then, rely on abstraction but also containment and 
association with a single individual: musically, the composer. Goehr coined the term ‘work-
concept’ to encapsulate her idea, defining musical works as ‘complete and discrete, original 
and fixed, personally owned units.’4  
 
This theoretical framework is important because it corresponds perfectly with how modern 
copyright professionals routinely use the term ‘work’ to denote discrete units under copyright 
protection, be they musical, artistic, or literary. As Anne Barron has observed: 
 
Copyright law—not unlike musicology—operates with a conception of the 
musical artefact as a bounded expressive form originating in the compositional 
efforts of some individual: a fixed, reified work of authorship.5 
  
Friedemann Sallis has identified a ‘weak’ work concept informing music composition before 
the French Revolution: composer-performers were seen as enacting a craft, and music was 
about events rather than ideas; process rather than product. This was overtaken by ‘the era of 
the strong work concept’ from the late 1700s to the present day, in which ‘music conceived 
as “works” consigned to paper… emerged as a new concept that had a major impact in 
Western culture.’6 Significantly, the newer concept acquired a regulative role, not only in 
terms of aesthetic ideology but also by influencing copyright legislation: 
 
In the early eighteenth century, publishing houses acquired copyright… insofar 
as sheets of music were produced. For most of the eighteenth century copyright 
remained so defined. In 1793, however, copyright laws were passed in France to 
transfer ownership away from publishers to composers… [reflecting] the basic 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Gary Carpenter, Sarah Rodgers, Edward Gregson, Harriet Wybor, and Julia Haferkorn 
for their thoughtful comments that informed this chapter. 
2 ‘Classical music’ is used through the chapter to denote art music (i.e. music made primarily for purposes other 
than entertainment or profit) typified by a division of labour between composer and performer achieved through 
the use of notation. The classical music referred to is implicitly Western; the first part of this definition could 
also apply to non-Western classical music, but not necessarily all of the second part. While the term is 
admittedly contested and polysemous, it (and its cognates in other languages) is commonly used in public with 
such meanings. For further discussion, see my article ‘Vive la différence’, M [PRS Members’ Music Magazine], 
12 (2004), 16–18. 
3 See Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music (2nd edn; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2–3. Goehr draws on and develops arguments previously expounded 
by Roman Ingarden (the problematic ontology of musical works) and Carl Dahlhaus (the paradigmatic centrality 
of Beethoven). 
4 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 206. 
5 Anne Barron, ‘Harmony or Dissonance? Copyright Concepts and Musical Practice’, Social and Legal Studies, 
15/1 (March, 2006), 25. 
6 Friedemann Sallis, Music Sketches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 2–3. 
 
 
idea that composers are the first owners of their works, for it is they who put the 
works in permanent form [by notating them].7 
 
Goehr and others have traced the rise of this strong work-concept, which spread from France 
across Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—a period in which the 
enduring productions of copyright legislation and Viennese musical life also flourished. The 
pivotal figurehead, of course, was Ludwig van Beethoven, who effectively elevated the 
musical score from being ‘a more or less detailed map to being a full and complete 
representation of a work.’8 Similarly, a composition was no longer mere craftsmanship but an 
autonomous work of transcendent art.9 An emerging Romantic aesthetic accordingly 
emphasised, and valorised, originality. 
  
This cultural zeitgeist engendered changes in copyright legislation that enhanced abstraction. 
New laws were enacted to extend protection to performances of musical works (the 
“performing right”) in Prussia (1837) and the United Kingdom (Thomas Talfourd’s Act of 
1842).10 The ideology of Romanticism continues to inform the regulative function of the 
work-concept: both modernist classical music and the rock concept of “authenticity” inherit 
elements of it, as qualities such as rebellion, shock, alienation, the transcendent power of the 
original, and the aspiration to art attest. The incorporation of popular musics into the ambit of 
the work-concept is particularly interesting—and, as we shall see, relevant to classical music. 
In nineteenth-century France, such styles were originally excluded from legislation, being 
considered insufficiently ‘original’ or worthy of artistic or commercial status.11 Because 
certain popular forms, such as Victorian ballads and Tin Pan Alley standards, divide labour 
between writer(s) and performers—a mode still evident in modern pop icons reliant on “hit 
factories” or shows such as The X Factor—they more obviously fit the work-concept 
template than, say, the group dynamic of later blues-based rock music, where the functions 
and boundaries of composers, performers, and indeed of the work itself, are more blurred.12  
 
For popular music productions in oral traditions to acquire copyright protection, the tangible 
trace (in copyright law, the “fixed form”) becomes the original recording. This requires some 
abstract thinking on the part of lawyers and administrators to conceptualise the “work” 
underlying and separate from the sounds (a case of strengthening a weak work-concept). In 
the UK, copying the underlying works in musical recordings (“mechanical copyright”) was 
first controlled by the 1911 Copyright Act, which led to the establishment of what became the 
Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society (MCPS, allied with the Performing Right Society 
(PRS) since 1998). Protection of copyright in sound recordings themselves was established 
by a court case that led to the founding of the “neighbouring rights” (i.e. non-authorial 
copyright) society Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) in 1934.   
 
                                                          
7 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 218. 
8 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 227. 
9 Drawing on Dahlhaus, Sallis discusses how ‘Beethoven… claimed for music the strong concept of art… [for] 
an instrumental composition could now exist as an “art work of ideas” transcending its various interpretations.’ 
Sallis, Music Sketches, 20. Nicholas Cook also links Beethoven’s (Dahlhaus-identified) conception of music—
an ideal, imaginary realm—to the composer’s profound deafness. See Nicholas Cook, Music: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 26.  
10 See Friedemann Kawohl, ‘Commentary on the Prussian Copyright Act (1837)’ and Ronan Deazley, 
‘Commentary on Copyright Amendment Act 1842’, in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900), ed. Lionel 
Bently and Martin Kretschmer (2008), www.copyrighthistory.org (accessed 5 June 2017). France had already 
protected performances through the Revolutionary laws of 1791/93, as noted by Goehr. 
11 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 219. 
12 See also Jason Toynbee, ‘Musicians’, in Music and Copyright, ed. Simon Frith and Lee Marshall (2nd edn; 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 126–28.  
 
 
As Ron Moy has argued, the evolution chronicled here has much to do with a general desire 
to identify popular music-based products with individuals, and the consequent necessity to 
construct singular authorial subjects.13 More recent popular music forms, such as electronic 
dance music with its reliance on sampling and remixing, have posed stronger ontological 
challenges to the work-concept. Such issues will be revisited later in the chapter, which 
focuses primarily on the copyrights of classical composers.14 It scrutinises how and why the 
PRS instituted a Classical Music Subsidy and removed it at the end of the twentieth century. 
The episode illuminates the roles of collecting societies, how the performing right is mediated 
in practice, and how socio-political shifts reframe copyright societies in general and classical 
music in particular. Finally, we zoom out to examine contemporary copyright challenges and 
debates, again nuanced by a classical music perspective. 
 
Like academia, the worlds of copyright and collecting societies are replete with acronyms and 
specialist terminology. While the former will be defined in the text, Figure 1 offers a glossary 
of some key terms from musicology and collecting society policy and practice which recur 
throughout this chapter.        
 
 
Collective Licensing: The Performing Right Society (PRS) 
 
To administer copyrights, composers and their publishers rely on collecting societies to 
license music “users” on their behalf, from live and recorded performance premises and 
cinemas, to record labels, broadcasters, and, more recently, online entities.15 Also known as 
authors’ societies, or Performing Right Organisations (PROs) when performing rights are 
involved, collecting societies are typically national monopolies, linked by reciprocal 
agreements with affiliated societies across the world. The PRS (“PRS for Music” since 2009) 
was formed in 1914 with a committee of composers, authors, and publishers.16 Composers 
were largely drawn from the popular and light music sphere, but classical publishers were 
well represented, including William Boosey and Charles Volkert (of German publisher 
Schott, among other publishers). Tracing the society’s history three-quarters of a century 
later, Cyril Ehrlich argued that  
 
[The PRS], as it approached a seventy-fifth birthday, continued to serve the 
general public no less than its members. The former were provided with access to 
the world’s music, easily and cheaply, while giving due reward to its producers… 
Among the members there was general satisfaction with the Society: an efficient 
alliance of interests, maintaining a reasonable balance between writers and 
publishers, [and between] serious and popular music.17 
 
This Panglossian conclusion may not have been entirely inappropriate at the time of the 
book’s publication, yet a mere decade later members, management, the Board, and even 
promoters, would be at loggerheads—a situation that threatened to pull the PRS apart and, 
                                                          
13 See Ron Moy, Authorship Roles in Popular Music: Issues and Debates (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
14 Incidentally, classical (and all) performers have enjoyed explicit protection of their recorded performances as 
intellectual property since the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) instituted the 1996 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. 
15 Classical publishers usually require copyright to be assigned for its full term, although it can also be 
reassigned or fixed-term licensing agreements can be negotiated. 
16 PRS, like other PROs, acquires control of the performing right through legal assignment, and shares royalties 
between music/text authors and publishers. This legal and distributive principle is also applied to the mechanical 
right by societies in mainland Europe.  
17 Cyril Ehrlich, Harmonious Alliance: A History of the Performing Right Society (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 157. 
 
 
according to some, to decimate the composing profession in the UK. Let us now explore the 




To the Arts Council, it had been an ‘enlightened example of musical patronage.’18 To British 
Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA) chief executive Chris Green its 
removal was ‘the most terrible tragedy.’19 To Terri Anderson (PRS’s then Communications 
Director), its abolition was part of the ‘slaughtering of a number of sacred cows’ by a 
‘determined and unsentimental’ chief executive, John Hutchinson.20 To composer George 
Benjamin, its disappearance was ‘the worst thing that has happened to classical music in my 
lifetime.’21 One of many changes PRS made to its distribution policy at the end of the 
twentieth century, the withdrawal of its subsidy for live classical concert royalties was a high 
drama of cultural politics, bitter wrangling, unresolved resentments, and long-term 
relationship disruption. The voluminous textual trace left by the episode allows us to recount 
the facts of the matter and to examine some of the contexts and ideologies underlying 
participants’ actions, responses, and debates. 
 
What was the Classical Music Subsidy (CMS)? The origins of the mechanism that had 
acquired this label by the 1990s are hard to pinpoint, but its contexts are clear. The first is the 
enormity of the task facing all PROs in identifying all public performances of copyright 
music by any means within their given territory of jurisdiction; that is, licensing them and 
acquiring data to inform distributions of this ‘general’ revenue (see glossary in Figure 1). 
Recorded public performances—to the smallest shop or bar with a radio, TV, or stereo 
playing in the background—are arguably hardest to identify. The impossibility of negotiating 
separate licenses for every work that might be used leads to “blanket” licensing solutions: in 
return for access to the repertoire of the licensing society and its international affiliates (that 
is, virtually all copyrighted music), users are charged according to tariffs for different types 
of use, creating revenue “pools”. Likewise, the impracticality of having a direct royalty 
distribution from every licence fee paid to every work performed (sometimes called a 
“straight line”) means that distributions of general revenue have always depended to an 
extent on ideological decisions. And while broadcasters are easier to manage in licensing and 
reporting terms, the issue of how to allocate, or subdivide, into multiple usage subcategories 
those large blanket licence lump sums paid annually by public broadcasters such as the BBC 
is inevitably a matter of collecting society policy.  
 
This practical reality leads to a second, more specific context, which Ehrlich outlines: 
 
Methods of redistributing income within the Society had been discussed at least 
since the 1920s, when there was talk about compensating “serious work” as 
against “commercial music”. It was also a policy long established by CISAC 
[Confédération Internationale de Sociétés d’Auteurs et Compositeurs, the 
umbrella organisation representing collecting societies worldwide] that societies 
                                                          
18 Arts Council, ‘Specific Comments on the PRS’ Decision to Phase Out its Old-established Classical Music 
Subsidy’, in House of Commons: The Performing Right Society and the Abolition Of The Classical Music 
Subsidy (5th report of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 1999), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmcumeds/468/46803.htm (accessed 17 
November 2016). 
19 House of Commons, Question 67 of ‘Examination of Witnesses’. 
20 Terri Anderson, Giving Music its Due (London: MCPS-PRS Alliance, 2004), 132, 138.  
21 George Benjamin, quoted in Stephen Moss, ‘Used Notes Only’, The Guardian (11 January 2001), 
https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2001/jan/11/artsfeatures (accessed 9 June 2017).  
 
 
should give preferential treatment to serious works when distributing royalties, 
usually by means of paying more per minute for longer works.22  
 
As the end of Ehrlich’s last sentence implies—although this has not always been 
appreciated—“serious work” is not inherently identified with classical music in this context. 
Nor is the “serious” intent necessarily located in the music itself. A PRS bulletin from the 
early 1970s that refined “general” distributions explicitly invokes an underlying principle to 
distribute according to the type of usage rather than the nature of the music used.23 This 
implies less an appraisal of musical worth and more a value judgement about modes of 
engaging with music: rapt, undivided attention in the concert hall was deemed more serious 
than performances at dances, for example, and was rewarded with higher royalty payments, 
whether their composers were Benjamin Britten or The Beatles. Other factors influencing live 
royalties also tended to objective phenomena: number of performed lines adduced from 
notified instrumentation, duration, and concert hall capacity. Such an approach is echoed by 
international PROs today (see Figure 2 for comparisons), where the music’s scale and 
ambition (‘symphonic’, ‘complex’, with more ‘voices’, longer duration) as much as its style 
is invoked to justify enhanced royalty payments. Indeed, the stylistic marker ‘classical’ is 
rarely used explicitly. 
 
Framed in largely utilitarian terms, a 1978 article in the PRS Yearbook defines the Classical 
(serious) Music Subsidy and its rationale: 
 
Performing Right Societies across the world generally accept that, as the 
production of works of serious music involves a far greater investment of time 
and labour on the part of their  creators than most of the more popular forms of 
music, and that as performances of such works are relatively few and far 
between, it is appropriate that the societies should adopt preferential forms of 
treatment for these works in their distribution of royalties, both in order 
adequately to remunerate the actual performances and also to encourage the 
continued creation of such works.24   
 
Reference follows to a decision to create a specific revenue pool for serious music concerts 
with ‘a reasonably substantial amount of revenue from other sources to be added by way of 
subsidy.’25 In other words, licence revenues from all serious/classical music concerts in a 
given year were paid into the same pot, topped up with general revenue so that the 
distributable amount was more than 100% of gross collections, then divided up into “points” 
with fixed values for distribution purposes, weighted exponentially towards longer works and 
larger forces. Classical publishers and composers benefitted not only through the subsidy, 
then, but also because of the pooling (which made royalties predictable) and weighting 
towards the more labour-intensive compositions. Instrumentation was not taken into account 
in allocating royalty points for radio and television broadcasts, but longer pieces were 
rewarded with a higher rate per minute (“bonus for length”), in accordance with the CISAC 
principle outlined by Ehrlich above.26   
         
How this dispensation disintegrated is a function of general cultural change and specific 
events in the 1990s. The previous decade saw publishing and recording companies 
incorporated into global conglomerates, invariably dominated by pop and other commercial 
musics and empowering these “majors” within the PRS. As Andrew Potter, then Chairman of 
                                                          
22 Ehrlich, Harmonious Alliance, 155–56. 
23 See ‘General Fees Distributions’, Performing Right, 6 (November, 1971), 40–1. 
24 PRS, ‘How PRS Helps Serious Music’, PRS Yearbook (1978), 66–7; emphasis added. 
25 PRS Yearbook (1978), 66. 
26 Concert performances attracted a similar bonus until 1988. 
 
 
the Society, remarked: ‘PRS stopped being a gentleman’s club and became a business.’27 
Signs of change are found in the 1988/89 PRS Yearbook, which described the abolition of 
royalty weighting according to instrumentation, and declared that a wider range of 
performances would benefit from subsidy via a new ‘semi-classical’ category.28 A review of 
the broadcasting bonus for length multiplier was also announced, while additional notes made 
the pointed observation that 1987 had ‘produced payments that were disproportionate in 
relation to those [payments] applicable to larger [presumably popular] ones’.29 Significantly, 
the more neutral term “serious music” had become the stylistically marked (othered?) 
“classical music”. Attempts in the late 1980s to raise tariffs for live concerts of all genres 
were only partially successful, leading to a new live music policy in 1992 where both 
classical and popular concerts held at a list of several hundred ‘significant venues’ were 
guaranteed royalty distributions, subsidised from general (live) revenue.30 This marked a shift 
towards parity of treatment, distributionally speaking, for pop and classical concerts; 
previously, only popular music events earning over a certain licence fee had been distributed, 
while all classical concerts had been eligible for distribution.31  
 
The primary catalyst for a further raft of distribution policy changes was a referral—by the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to the Monopolies and Mergers commission (MMC)—to 
investigate the PRS. An OFT press notice referred to  
 
complaints made by composers of less popular forms of music that they were 
receiving inadequate royalty payments [and] lacked sufficient representation; 
[and that] the revenue distribution policies recently adopted by the Society [i.e.  
the 1992 live music policy] unduly favoured composers and publishers of more 
popular forms of music.32  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, then, this was no flexing of the muscles of the majors seeking more 
power, but a revolt from “below”. (The complainants are understood to have included 
classical composers, as the press notice, indeed, implies.) The PRS’s voting structure has 
arguably tended to perpetuate financial inequality among its members by linking voting 
rights, and therefore influence on policy, to earnings.33 Conducted in 1995, the MMC 
investigation reported in February 1996. Its authors called for a review of the live music 
distribution policy and alluded to the possibility of statistically ‘sampling’ all areas of public 
performance (see Figure 1). They further commented: 
 
                                                          
27 Andrew Potter, quoted in Anderson, Giving Music its Due, 100. 
28 PRS Yearbook (1988/89), 65. The new category explicitly included ‘avant-garde jazz’ performed to audiences 
‘there primarily to hear the music’ in the context of ‘undisturbed listening’, echoing the society’s 1971 
terminology describing ‘serious’ music. Two years later, ‘semi-classical’ became ‘light classical’. See PRS 
Yearbook (1990/91), 74. 
29 The bonus for length for TV broadcasts was abolished in 1988; that for radio was retained until 1998. See 
PRS News, 27 (October, 1988), 12–13; and PRS News, 49 (May, 1997), 10. 
30 This policy also abolished the “light classical” category and is detailed in a supplement to PRS News, 33 
(Autumn, 1991), 2–5. 
31 The 1992 policy was, however, amended the following year to allow classical members to be paid for 
performances at ‘non-significant’ venues on a claims-only basis. In parallel, the subsidy for popular concerts 
was removed, perhaps shoring up resentment from that sector towards the continuing subsidy for classical 
music. See PRS News, 38 (Autumn, 1993), 2.      
32 OFT, Press Notice 54/94 (30 November 1994). 
33 See https://www.prsformusic.com/about-us/governance/prs-membership-categories (accessed 6 June 2017). 
 
 
The classical music subsidy… has been in place for many years and appears from 
the evidence provided to us to have the broad approval of both writer and 
publisher members.34 
 
The PRS’s subsequent Distribution and Data Review became increasingly imbued with the 
ethos of cost-benefit analysis, concluding that ‘we need to ensure that the resources we 
devote to collecting and processing performance data are in proportion to the revenue at 
stake.’35 
 
On the subsidy itself, a PRS questionnaire divided opinion: 48% of members were found to 
be in favour of it, 48% against, and 4% had no view, to which the Board responded that it 
planned ‘no action at present, and has noted this response.’36 The reassuring tone soon 
became more measured (‘the classical music-subsidy is now being re-evaluated’),37 and in 
early 1999 a Subsidies Taskforce was set up to ‘ensure… any support of subsidy payments 
will adhere to the MMC instructions… [in order to] distinguish clearly between distribution 
rules and cultural support and donation.’38 By now, however, the die was cast. In fact, a 
December 1998 press release had announced the phasing-out of the CMS and the 
implementation of the new live music policy.39 In practice, this meant: that the last major 
classical distribution under the old (1992) policy, with its ‘significant’ venues and fixed 
royalty values incorporating a full subsidy,40 took place in July 1999; that classical concerts 
from the start of 1999 were “sampled”, with only concerts generating a licence fee of £75 or 
more being guaranteed distribution, and sample rates decreasing according to box office 
value;41 and that the subsidy was to disappear completely by 2001.    
 
In amelioration, the PRS initiated a gradual escalation of the tariff (“LC”) charged to classical 
concert promoters, rising from 3.3% initially to 7.3% by 2007, in order to maintain revenue 
in the live classical sector by increasing collections rather than supplementing them from 
other revenue areas.42 (This is comparable with the current practice of the Spanish society 
Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE)—see Figure 2). Additionally, a new £1 
million fund to support contemporary music was announced, which effectively enhanced an 
existing committee that dealt with Donations & Awards, but which was soon branded the 
PRS Foundation.43 While this money was available on application to composers and 
songwriters of any genre with a demonstrable need for support, the timing of PRS 
                                                          
34 MMC (now the Competition and Markets Authority), Performing Rights: A Report on the Supply in the UK of 
the Services of Administering Performing Rights and Film Synchronisation Rights (February, 1996), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20111202195250/http:/competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1996/378performing.htm, Section 2.82 (accessed 17 November 2016).  
35 PRS News, 52 (Summer, 1998).  
36 See PRS News, 47 (Autumn, 1996), 7. 
37 PRS News, 52 (Summer, 1998), 18. 
38 PRS News, 53 (January, 1999), 3. 
39 This dates the decision to remove the subsidy to that December’s Board. Only two of its members voted 
against the decision. 
40 Which at this time boosted live classical revenue to the tune of 170% of receipts.  
41 The threshold for guaranteed payment was reduced to £50 in 2000. Since 2004, all such concerts have, in 
principle, been distributable.  
42 However, following a referral by the Association of British Concert Promoters to the Copyright Tribunal, the 
tariff was settled at 4.8% in December 2003.  
43 The Foundation’s funding model was also different, and less politically contentious. While Donations & 
Awards had been funded with a percentage of distributable revenue, the Foundation was, and remains, funded 








Reaction, Counter-reaction, and Debate 
 
The first salvo in response to the withdrawal of the CMS came from a group subsequently 
known as the Classical Music Alliance (CMA).45 A letter of protest was signed by Donald 
Mitchell (chairman of the Britten Estate and former PRS Director) and leading composers 
Harrison Birtwistle, Peter Maxwell Davies, and Mark-Anthony Turnage.46 John Tavener and 
Paul McCartney, among others, were subsequently identified as supporters.47 The letter 
rehearsed several arguments that would characterise subsequent debate: that compared with 
mainland European societies, classical concert tariffs were low; that the subsidy therefore 
brought royalties up to an appropriate (that is, comparable) level; that PRS members were 
insufficiently consulted; that the timing was poor (perhaps a reference to the press release 
issued just before Christmas); and that the effect of removing the subsidy on the UK classical 
music industry, especially ‘young British composers of the future’, was great relative to its 
cost and the lack of tangible effect on other members’ earnings. 
 
Two further arguments were added in a letter sent a week later by representatives of leading 
contemporary classical publishers.48 The first was a utilitarian argument about the labour and 
cost of preparing performance materials (that is, scores and parts) for contemporary classical 
performances, and the consequent need for long-term investment that might never be 
recouped.49 The second was that removing the CMS was ‘the last straw’ following a series of 
changes adversely affecting classical music, in particular the removal of the instrumentation 
multiplier at the turn of the 1990s, and the removal of the radio bonus for length in 1998.50 
Unrepentant, Hutchinson responded by defending: the new system’s greater fairness and 
transparency as a consequence of the straight line between collection and distribution of 
concert revenue;51 the avoidance of problematic value judgements and differentiation 
between genres; the fact, based on the aforementioned questionnaire, that supporters of the 
scheme did not form a majority of the membership; and that the largest beneficiaries of the 
subsidy were not young British composers, but the estates of deceased composers and 
members of overseas PROs affiliated to the PRS.52  
 
                                                          
44 For example: the Foundation’s announcement in July coincided with the final fully-subsidised distribution of 
classical concert revenue. See PRS News, 55 (August, 1999), 1–2. Sarah Rodgers (former Chairman of 
BASCA’s Concert Executive) confirms that ‘creation of the PRS Foundation, at the suggestion of John 
Hutchinson, was definitely a gesture of compensation towards the disenfranchised classical members.’ Rodgers, 
correspondence with the author, 5 July 2017. 
45 See Andrew Stewart, ‘PRS under Fire from Classical Music Pressure Group’, Classical Music (6 March 
1999), 5. 
46 See Donald Mitchell, ‘Classical Concerts Income “Halved”’, The Times (23 February 1999), 19. Other 
signatories included conductor Simon Rattle and composer/broadcaster Michael Berkeley. 
47 See Stewart, ‘PRS Under Fire from Classical Music Pressure Group’. 
48 Trevor Glover [Boosey & Hawkes], ‘From Mr Trevor Glover and Others’, The Times (1 March 1999), 21. 
Other signatories were Chris Butler (Novello), Sally Groves (Schott), Martin Kingsbury (Faber Music), Ben 
Newing (Universal Edition), and James Rushton (Chester Music). 
49 This was an (intentionally?) ironic echo of the PRS’s own former view, as expressed in its ‘How PRS Helps 
Serious Music’ features, published annually between 1978 and 1988.  
50 See notes 26 and 29. 
51 That is, the total concert royalty equalling the licence fee minus an administration charge (20% as of 
December 2016). This is further divided, proportionately according to duration, between the copyright works in 
the programme. For more on “straight-lining”, see Moss, ‘Used Notes Only’.  
52 John Hutchinson, ‘End of “Subsidy” for Classical Music’, The Times (1 March 1999), 21. 
 
 
The Guardian newspaper also hosted the debate, with composer Colin Matthews echoing the 
‘last straw’ argument,53 and drawing a repost from Andrew King of pop publisher Mute 
Song: 
 
Once again the grandees of the world of classical music emerge from their rural 
retreats… The beneficiaries of this scheme [the CMS] have kept very quiet about 
it until, as a result of a widely supported effort to bring the PRS out of its fustian 
gloom by updating its business practices… this subsidy… is to be removed… 
These people have always insisted that only their value judgements, which are 
consistently self-serving, have any merit.54 
 
King’s combative tone typifies a certain view of the classical music industry, problematises 
the sector’s presumed claim to the “transcendence” of its music, and points to broader 
questions concerning the genre’s relevance and purpose at the turn of the century (and, 
indeed, since).55 There was an irony in King attacking a genre that effectively gave rise to the 
musical work/copyright concept on which all pop publishers’ business models rely. 
Nevertheless, the heightening of rhetoric continued when Hutchinson provocatively quoted a 
comment (attributed to Mitchell) from the MMC report—that ‘the moral basis for PRS 
“depended on its being perceived as fairly representing the interests of every sector of the 
membership and serving impartially the creators and their publishers across the musical 
spectrum”.’56 Aggravated, Mitchell duly rose to the challenge: 
 
Turning his fire on me will not save Mr Hutchinson when he has to face the 
cultural and political fall-out from the assault he is leading PRS to mount against 
the very sector which founded PRS in 1914. The Society’s creators must be 
turning in their graves.57    
  
The very public debate soon migrated to the pages of industry journal Classical Music, whose 
editorial observed how ‘the PRS has a long history of upsetting its classical members’, 
adding the context of the Significant Venues scheme and the lack of financial rewards 
accruing to classical composition.58  
 
The CMA sought government mediation, and a Select Committee hearing chaired by Labour 
MP Gerald Kaufman was held in mid 1999. Several new ideas and observations were 
developed by the witnesses and their interlocutors: that classical composers and publishers 
might form their own collecting society to break PRS’s monopoly, a prospect the Chief 
Executive of Boosey & Hawkes considered unviable however;59 that new classical music is 
disseminated overwhelmingly through infrequent live performance, whereas more popular 
                                                          
53 Colin Matthews, ‘Cough up, PRS’, The Guardian (13 March 1999), 
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/mar/13/guardianletters (accessed 8 June 2017). 
54 Andrew King, ‘Pay Scales’, The Guardian (15 March 1999), 
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/mar/15/guardianletters (accessed 8 June 2017). 
55 See, for example, Norman Lebrecht, When The Music Stops (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Conversely, 
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Choice and Musical Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
56 John Hutchinson, ‘Discord in Musical Fraternity’, The Guardian (23 March 1999), 
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57 Donald Mitchell, ‘Oscars Won’t Make up for a Cut in Composers’ Royalties’, The Guardian (27 March 
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58 Keith Clarke, ‘[Editorial]’, Classical Music (3 April 1999), 3. 
59 House of Commons, ‘The Performing Right Society and the Abolition of the Classical Music Subsidy’, 
Question 4 of ‘Examination of Witnesses’. 
 
 
genres place greater emphasis on recordings and broadcasts;60 that the CMS contained 
anomalies, for example that popular works performed in classical concerts would receive it, 
but not vice versa because the subsidy was awarded to licensable events, rather than to 
individual works. As Kaufman elaborated: 
 
In any kind of logic whatsoever, the internal PRS Subsidy is anomalous and unjustified… On 
the other hand, any kind of subsidy from the Arts Council or anywhere else is not going to 
provide an impulsion for performance in a way that the PRS subsidy has done.61 
 
The rhetoric of taking money from genres (other than classical music) was stressed by those 
opposing the subsidy,62 upheld by the Committee,63 and even acknowledged by some of its 
defenders (such as BASCA), although the reality of this characterisation was, had been, and 
continued to be disputed in other quarters.64 Nevertheless, the PRS’s decision, and its right to 
make it, was condoned by politicians perhaps imbued with the Government’s 
contemporaneous “Cool Britannia” agenda,65 wherein cultural advocacy and ambassadorship 
was associated with popular music, typified by Britpop, rather than with “art” music.          
 
As the impact of the new policy began to be felt, attention was redirected to another of its 
controversies: the statistical sampling of live classical performances. Sally Cavender (Faber 
Music) tactically echoed the market-oriented rhetoric of the policy’s proponents:  
 
[Statistical] sampling is fine for pop, but not for classical music. The system just 
doesn’t meet the needs of our market segment. We don’t want handouts—we 
want payment because our pieces are being played.66  
 
A Guardian editorial in January 2001 even called on Culture Secretary Chris Smith to 
intervene—rather late in the day, given the Select Committee had concluded in 1999, 
observing that ‘PRS’s approach, which links box-office success to the likelihood of a 
composer being rewarded, will encourage a play-safe approach and discourage risk-taking.’67 
Faber’s Richard Paine had already criticised the policy’s unabashed commercialism, claiming 
it would ‘inevitably favour the established and successful composers at the expense of the up-
and-coming.68’ Ironically, PRS had often made similar arguments to criticise the failure of 
the CMS to support living or young composers. It repeatedly quoted statistics on the 
percentage of subsidy paid to estates of deceased composers and affiliate societies, although 
                                                          
60 House of Commons, Question 81 of ‘Examination of Witnesses’. In the same report, see also: ‘Memorandum 
submitted by the Publishers of Classical Music’, Section 2; and ‘Memorandum submitted by The Classical 
Music Alliance’, Section 3.1.1.  
61 House of Commons, Question 58. 
62 This had been pre-empted in another part of Andrew King’s letter cited above: ‘The classical music subsidy 
operated by the Performing Right Society has taken money earned from performances of works by other 
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63 House of Commons, ‘Conclusions’, Sections 42–3. 
64 For example, the PRS’s former CEO Michael Freegard, as reported by Anderson: ‘UK writers and publishers 
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67 ‘Air on a Shoestring’, The Guardian (11 January 2001). 
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68 Richard Paine, ‘Young Composers’, The Times (20 September 1999), 19. 
 
 
some of those estates were quick to retort that such money was redistributed through schemes 
to support young musicians or new music.69  
 
 
Analysis, International Comparisons, and Consequences 
 
What are we to make of the above episode? What does it tell us about classical music, 
copyright, and British cultural politics? Composer and long-term PRS board member Edward 
Gregson now believes that the CMS ‘emerged as a “problem” [because of] the increasing 
presence and variation of pop board members’, who were concerned exclusively with 
financial “bottom lines”.70 Sarah Rodgers feels that while the MMC report did not threaten 
the classical subsidy directly, it ‘opened a chink’ in the longstanding settlement described by 
Ehrlich.71 She believes that this allowed pop publishers, who had moved away from 
“gentlemanly” congeniality and towards a market-driven foregrounding of individual 
corporate interests, to argue away the subsidy by promulgating the “level playing field” 
argument.72 The Arts Council’s belief at the time that the ‘view of PRS’ General Council… 
[is] that the cultural consensus underlying the [CMS] has broken down’ offers a broader 
context,73 as do parallels the same organisation drew with the fact that its own funding for 
music had, until the mid 1980s, been directed exclusively towards classical music. To recall 
the start of this chapter: if popular songs were to be conceived as ‘works’, they could now be 
considered ‘art’; but by the same token, now effectively stripped of its transcendent artistic 
status, British classical music was exposed, unprecedentedly, to the harsh realities of the 
commercial music industry.74 In fact, the Arts Council advocated reorienting subsidy across 
many minority genres, couching the argument in instrumentalist terms to argue that 
‘investment in uncommercial repertoire—R&D expenditure—is essential for the long-term 
health of the music industry.’75 The PRS did not adopt their suggestion. 
 
A lynchpin of arguments in favour of the subsidy was greater parity with overseas affiliates, 
particularly in mainland Europe where most societies did (and still do) apply royalty 
                                                          
69 See, for example, the enduring grant-giving programme of the Britten-Pears Foundation: 
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most benefitted the estates of frequently performed early and mid twentieth-century composers, their publishers 
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73 House of Commons. ‘Specific Comments on the PRS’ Decision to Phase Out its Old-established Classical 
Music Subsidy’. 
74 That said, even under the previous consensual settlement, “serious” composers had been vulnerable to the 
market. As Alan Peacock and Ronald Weir observed in the 1970s, ‘there must be few professions who have to 
face up to the fact that their professional evaluations of their creations are so much at variance with the 
judgement of the consumer expressed in what the latter is willing to pay.’ Alan Peacock and Ronald Weir, The 
Composer in the Market Place (London: Faber, 1975), 31. 
75 House of Commons, ‘Specific Comments’. 
 
 
weightings that benefit classical music (Figure 2), even if they are not always framed as such. 
Moreover, mainland European societies generally achieve higher concert licensing tariffs.76  
Why did something that is politically possible in other countries become untenable in the 
UK? The enormous success and strength of the Anglo-American popular music industry 
looms large, both culturally and organisationally; Rodgers, for example, observes the greater 
regard other European countries pay to classical music traditions, be they long and unbroken 
or identified with national independence movements.77 Similarly, PRS’s voting structure is 
not replicated in other European collecting societies, where major publishers tend to have less 
influence. Since the 1980s, British political culture has tended to view classical music with 
suspicion: for some on the Left, its perceived elitism and lack of popular support can be 
problematic; on the Right, its hunger for public funding and subsidy compare unfavourably 
with the commercial success of popular music, coupled with the fact that, since the 1990s, 
some “classical” music has also crossed over (and been explicitly marketed) to become 
“commercial”. 
 
As for the episode’s consequences: this chapter has so far documented a deep rift between the 
UK’s classical composing and publishing community and its leading music copyright 
organisation. Some classical publishers and composers, however, defended the logic and, 
perhaps, the inevitability of removing the subsidy, not least PRS Chairman Andrew Potter 
(who also worked for Oxford University Press) and David Bedford (Potter’s successor at the 
PRS). Others accepted the Board’s decision but continue to believe, as Gregson argues, that 
‘support of classical music through distribution enhancement is justifiable.’78 He continues: 
 
I tried to argue that… supporting classical writers and publishers in some kind of 
enhanced manner… would benefit the music industry as a whole, as so many 
classically trained composers were, and still are, a vital part of the pop and media 
world. Sadly, that argument fell on deaf ears!79  
 
Discontent arising from the loss of the CMS was manifested both trivially—one anecdote 
tells of a classical publisher popping PRS-branded balloons at a sponsored classical event—
and as a lasting blow to trust and confidence. A more positive outcome, recommended in 
civil servant Richard Hooper’s review of PRS for Music in 2013, has been the appointment of 
a Classical Account Representative (Naomi Belshaw, 2014–16; Harriet Wybor since 2016). 
The role ‘acknowledged the need to build bridges’ with the community, as composer Gary 
Carpenter observes.80  
 
For Rodgers, it is as much a matter of the “soft” skills of understanding the language and 
milieu of classical music as it is “hard” policy,81 although she also talks of a transformation 
from royalties forming a reliable ‘central plank’ of composers’ incomes to composers having 
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78 Gregson, interview with the author. 
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to earn from parallel musical activities.82 However, the flow of new entrants to the British 
composing community has certainly not dried up in line with some of the direr predictions of 
the CMA. If anything, the community is larger, and more diverse, than it was at the turn of 
the century. Rodgers, Wybor, and Gregson all acknowledge that conditions in the UK today 
make it very difficult, but not impossible, to pursue a career exclusively as a classical 
composer.83 At the same time, classical music is now less narrowly defined it than it once 
was, with a broader range of opportunities, particularly for collaboration. Wybor points to 
new priorities for PRS for Music in improving reporting and responding quickly and 
effectively to ‘new forms of the market [with] simple and effective licensing solutions.’84 
One example is a new tariff for cinema simulcasts, introduced in 2013 to meet the growing 
popularity and value of live cinema relays of opera house productions.85  
 
 
Copyright Challenges and Classical Music 
 
Professional and academic discourses on copyright law and practice have diverged in recent 
decades in response to such technological and cultural changes as (unlicensed) digital 
sampling and the (illegitimate) online dissemination of music.86 To borrow John Oswald’s 
observation, cited by Simon Frith, ‘the legal challenge of digital technology is… that it blurs 
the boundary between production and consumption.’87 This also weakens the strong work-
concept on which copyright relies. Frith notwithstanding, academic literature tends to be 
situated in an American rather than European context, which highlights a further divide: 
between economically-based property theories of copyright prevalent in the US (and to an 
extent other English-speaking countries) and the inalienable droit d’auteur, a concept closer 
to that of human rights that emphasises moral rights and is fundamental to European civil law 
jurisdictions. Ideological backdrops similarly range from Ronald Bettig’s explicitly Marxist 
perspective,88 to out-and-out neoliberal capitalism, sometimes masquerading as quasi-
socialist “sharing”, to which we will return. Classical music is rarely explicitly considered in 
either industry or academic discourses.89       
                                                          
82 Rodgers, interview with the author. 
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competing for limited resources (financially and in terms of identifying suitable performers). The latter suggests 
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copyright  is not infringed on the internet (which simply provides a new and more convenient locus for the long 
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87 Simon Frith, ‘Music and Morality’, in Music and Copyright (1993), 19. 
88 See Ronald Bettig’s Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property (Westview: 
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In terms of changing copyright practice, Lawrence Lessig’s theories have been highly 
influential, being realised through licensing options that allow for different degrees of 
creators’ control, as outlined by the California-based organisation Creative Commons.90 
Lessig’s central premise is that digital technology and, relatedly, postmodern aesthetics have 
enabled society to recapture a kind of prelapsarian state of engaging with cultural products, 
rather than passively consuming them, as in the industrial age: RW (read-write) rather than 
RO (read-only) culture. Although Lessig’s differentiation of commercial and “sharing” 
economies and his ambitions to deregulate amateur creativity and simplify copyright are 
laudable,91 he appears to conceptualise musical creativity exclusively in terms of digitally 
manipulating existing commercial recordings. Lessig, and indeed others, have generally 
overemphasised the importance of (artistic) sampling, which, although prominent in certain 
genres, is not ubiquitous in mainstream rock and pop, let alone classical music. (Neither is it 
anything new conceptually, as the history of musical borrowings in classical repertoire 
attests.)92 His perception does, however, further illustrate how far the public image of musical 
creativity has moved from the classical model of the individual composer notating scores in 
isolation.   
 
Lessig has also recommended shorter copyright terms,93 and a reversion to the pre-1976 US 
(non-Berne Convention) principle of calculating copyright duration from the date of 
registration rather than from the death of the author (the post mortem auctoris or “pma” 
principle).94 This is a typical revelation of the conceptual split between property theory 
(copyright as a commodifiable, intellectual “product”) and droit d’auteur (copyright as an 
individual quasi-human right, inheritable by descendants). Crucially, it discounts the 
possibility that in some genres, such as classical music, successful reception and 
dissemination might be achieved over decades rather than years. Moreover, given Lessig’s 
hope to simplify copyright, it is hard to see this being achieved by replacing the simple 
“pma” principle with one that requires knowledge of dates of publication and potential 
renewals at work level. Indeed, the US copyright situation before 1976 was considered highly 
problematic in the industry.95        
 
Lessig’s manifesto, particularly concerning decriminalisation, implies great change, although 
his influential Creative Commons schemes have demonstrated their ability to coexist with, 
rather than overturn, extant copyright protection. Change more radical still was proposed in 
2017 by the UK Pirate Party:  
 
Copyright should give artists and innovators the chance to make money from 
their work; however, that needs to be balanced with the rights of society as a 
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90 See Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2008). For licensing schemes, see https://www.creativecommons.org (last accessed 4 July 2016). 
91 See Lessig, Remix, 254–72. 
92 Surprisingly, Scales (see note 89) foregrounds this weak work-concept tradition in classical music, which has 
largely been overshadowed by the Beethovenian strong work-concept. See Scales, ‘Sola, Perduta, 
Abbandonata’, 294. Quotations and other musical borrowings, including a kind of acoustic “sampling”, are 
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95 See Peacock and Weir, The Composer in the Market Place, 163. 
 
 
whole. We will work for copyright reform and reduce copyright terms to 10 years 
[from creation/publication] to balance everyone’s needs.96 
  
The party previously advocated a copyright term of five years from creation, renewable once. 
While European Pirate Parties generally present themselves as part of the radical left, the 
Deputy Leader of the Swedish Pirate Party (the original Pirate Party) revealed a nakedly 
neoliberal face when taken to task by Classical Music in 2009: 
 
Classical Music—Do you think that classical composers would be able to earn a 
living under this system [a five-years-from-creation copyright term]? 
 
Christian Engström—They will have to adapt their business model, that is what 
it is like being an entrepreneur, running a company which is in effect what most 
cultural work is. If you can’t make a profit from it, unfortunately you have to do 
something else. It is called a market economy and that is the way it is.97   
 
Representatives of BASCA quickly pointed out that this would ‘destroy the economic model 
of any collecting society’ and therefore also the chance to benefit even from this limited 
term.98 In the later UK manifesto, however, reference appears to be made to subsidising 
culture.99 It is striking that countries which enjoy high levels of cultural and welfare 
spending, such as those in the Nordic region,100 also have the highest popular support for 
Pirate Parties—perhaps implying that the Pirates’ supporters believe a social-democratic 
model could provide an alternative to comprehensive copyright protection. Yet states like 
Norway and Denmark offer basic incomes as well as publicly-funded commissions for their 
composers, with copyright income on top (which itself may be weighed towards serious 
music—see the policies of TONO and KODA outlined in Figure 2). For regimes where art 
music thrived without copyright protection we have to look, not to modern social-democratic 
states, but to older, feudal structures such as those of pre-modern Europe, where composition 




Despite their obvious flaws and apparent lack of consideration for classical music, the 
critiques and proposals we have examined do highlight that a reductive approach to 
distributing copyright royalties risks exacerbating the flow of a large percentage of available 
revenue to a small number of recipients. Notwithstanding the specific nature and needs of a 
genre such as classical music, collecting societies must consider how this balance is managed 
if they are to retain the confidence and support of their stakeholders. Anderson, indeed, 
recalls the ‘founding concept of the PRS as a collective… [where] almost everyone got 
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something.’101 Distributions of “black box” income, framed by PRS in terms of “unlogged 
performance” or “special” allocations but abolished in 1999, once offered emerging writers 
modest but tangible financial support.102 The social and cultural funding offered, and 
promotional work undertaken, by mainland European collecting societies has consequences 
beyond immediate benefits for the recipient. As pointed out by Michael Freegard, not least of 
these benefits is seen in the achievement of higher licensing tariffs than those gained by PRS 
for Music, partly due to the greater public and political awareness such work enables.103 
Collective licensing will always be necessary for public reception and the majority of live 
performances, and will maintain bargaining power when negotiating blanket broadcast 
licenses. However, technologies that promise shorter, immutable value chains from music 
users to copyright owners, such as Blockchain, threaten to undermine the collecting societies’ 
role, particularly in online arenas.104  
 
These tensions throw the focus back on to value of collective copyright licensing as a 
collective. As writers collaborate across genres, and publishers understand that they face the 
same types of challenges that writers face, the benefits of the collective become more 
obvious, particularly for new entrants to the profession. Indeed, arguably the greater benefit is 
the equality principle, whereby all writers and publishers, irrespective of their experience or 
status, receive the same per-work royalty rate for the same usage category and type. This 
principle does not play out when publishers license music directly, for example mechanical 
rights for most feature film and advertising usages, known as synchronisation or “sync” 
rights. The idea of new music, including (and perhaps especially) classical music, as a kind of 
R&D laboratory for innovative ideas that go on to benefit the mainstream has been espoused 
in many quarters, from the Arts Council to the Pirate Party.105  
 
While this argument leans rather heavily on economic instrumentalism, it does at least 
support the concept of incentivising, and rewarding, work beyond the immediately popular or 
profitable, whether through direct public funding or internal collecting society distribution 
policies. The latter need not take the form of explicit subsidy from one section to another, as 
revenue pooling itself has a democratising effect. (This is still carried out to a considerable 
extent within PRS for Music, as with other PROs.) Some kind of emerging writer allocation, 
in the form of a minimum royalty payment guaranteed for the first years of membership, 
would help ameliorate distribution inequality and provide rudimentary support for new 
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writers. The PRS actually operated such a guarantee, for the first two years of membership, as 
part of its unlogged performance allocation between 1992 and 1999.106   
 
Copyright legislation has developed in tandem with, and in response to, specific times and 
places. For musical copyrights, the work-concept as developed in the early nineteenth century 
in the context of European classical music remains paradigmatic; it has proved remarkably 
adaptable to different forms and contexts. Although the work of Goehr and others means that 
the work-concept is understood in musicology, the idea’s debt to classical music is 
insufficiently recognised in the music industry. After all, it informed part of the Berne 
Convention, a genuinely democratic and internationalist late nineteenth-century initiative 
whose precepts resonate today, even as they are challenged.107 If copyright generally, and 
Berne’s principles in particular, are to continue to thrive, a wider understanding of how they 
benefit individual creators (especially morally)—and hence those who appreciate their 
work—is important. As for collecting societies and other cultural institutions, the message of 
this chapter points to the need for acknowledgement and understanding of generic difference, 
in terms of language and support. This may go beyond the well-trodden pop/classical binary.  
 
Consider, lastly, non-Western “classical” music, long positioned by Western writers and 
scholars within the realm of ethnomusicology or, even more problematically, “world” music. 
How should copyright societies across the world treat such music? In what ways should (and 
do) they distinguish between “their” and “other” classical musics?108 What role, if any, 
should they have in encouraging, or incentivising, the development of such traditions?109 
These questions are pointers both to further research and towards a potential enriching of 




                                                          
106 The suggestion also has contemporary resonance with proposals mooted across the political spectrum to 
consider universal basic income. 
107 Moreover, its initial 1886 signatories were not limited to European nations, but included Tunisia, Liberia, 
and Haiti. 
108 An indicative example is the treatment of Indian classical musics by the PRS. Previously deemed non-
classical for programme classification purposes, such programmes are now classified as classical, thereby 
accruing the higher concert tariff “LC”. 
109 Michael Church, indeed, identifies most of the world’s classical music traditions other than Western as 
endangered. See Michael Church (ed.), The Other Classical Musics: Fifteen Great Traditions (Woodbridge: 
Boydell Press, 2015): 17. 
